The 1993 landmark United S tates Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow set out specific criteria for admission of expert testimony. A crucial question for economists raised by the decision is how damage analysis by economists might be impacted by theses new rules. To the extent that the courts have applied Daubert to decisions on the admissibility of ec ono mic testimony in the three years since Daubert, it has bee n almost e xclus ively in t he ar ea o f "hedonic damages." In a number of cases, courts have ruled that "hedonic damage" testimony does not meet the requirements of the Daubert decision. Only one has contained even an inference of probable acceptance of "hedonic damages. " This paper reviews the cases individually and examines the rationales by which the courts have denied admissibility to "hedonic damage" testimony in an at temp t t o ga rner insight into the pot ential impact of Daubert on testimony by economic experts. * The authors thank Robert Male for detailed suggestions for improving this paper.
Introduction
Since the decision in William Daubert et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US__, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, was anno unced o n June 28, 1993, eco nomists have been concerned with how the expanded criteria set forth by the Supr eme Court might affect t he admissibility of expert opinion. To date, the major aspect of economic testimony subjected to Daubert based judicial review has been the area of "hedonic damage" testimony, where economists provide testimony about the value of "loss of the enjoyment of life." This paper examines the r ationale of cou rt decisions in cases involving "hedonic damages" in light of the Daubert crit eria a nd at temp ts t o pr ovide initial insig ht int o t he impac t o f Daubert on the admissibility of this testimony by economic experts.
The paper begins with a very brief review of the Daubert decision and then co nsiders o ne case decided immediately prior to Daubert and t welve c ases the aut hors have been able to ident ify that explicitly address the admissibility of economic testimony on hedonic damages and that were decided between June 28, 1993 (the date of the Daubert decision) and April 5, 1996 (the date of the Kurncz decision, discussed below). 1 In the included cases, judges are speaking directly to their understandings of economic science and either explicitly or implicitly on how the Daubert Rule 403: Alt hou gh releva nt, evide nce ma y be excluded if it s pr oba tive value is substant ially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. (Pub.L. 93-595, Section 1, Jan. 2, 1975 , 88 Stat. 1932 Rule 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand t he evidence o r to determine a fact in issue, a witness qu alified as an exper t by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. (Pub.L. 93-595, Section 1, Jan. 2, 1975 , 88 Stat. 1937 Rule 703: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be tho se pe rceived by o r made kno wn to t he exp ert at o r befo re t he hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. (Pub.L. 93-595, Section 1, Jan. 2, 1975 , 88 Stat. 1937 Mar. 2, 1987 , eff. Oct. 1, 1987 decision or closely related Federal Rules of Evidence 2 (FRE) have influenced their employments of t hos e under standings. The na mes o f exp ert s pr offe red to offe r "he donic damag e" t est imony, most of whom are well known among forensic economists, are identified, adding to the interest.
Moreover, for the first time in the authors' experience, judicial references are seen to articles that have been published in the various fo rensic economic jou rnals, o ffering some insight into t he potential effect of this literature on judicial decision making processes.
The Meaning of the Daubert Case
The decision of the United Stat es Supreme Court in Daubert has been hailed as a landmark decision concerning t he admissibility of expert testimony in feder al cases involving Evidence. The essence of the Frye test was that the admissibility of expert scient ific testimony 4 Livingston v. U.S., 817 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1993) . We also include this case because it is one of only two cases we discuss in which economists are referenced on both sides. was dep endent on its general acceptance within the professional community from which the "science" was drawn. To assist the district courts in following this mandate, the Supreme Court provided extensive explication of its understanding of the requirements of those rules, identifying three basic areas that should be considered by trial court judges in admitting expert test imony: (1) T he qualifications of the expert to render the information; (2) the admissibility of the evidence or testimony the expert would offer; and (3) the sufficiency of the information in assisting the jury to reach its decision. The meanings of each of these Daubert criteria has been discussed at length 5 "Qua lificat ions and Admissibility: Applying the Daubert Ma ndat e to Economic Testimony," Walter D. Johnson and Thomas R. Ireland, paper presented at the Allied Social Sciences Meeting, January 5-7, 1996. 6 Cases are presented in chronological order except when several state cases have a close relationship to each other, as with the two New Mexico cases and the three Louisiana cases, where the second (and third) case is presented immediately following the first , rather than chr ono log ically. 7 The Federal To rts Claim Act (FTCA) is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity allowing recovery of compensatory damages against the United States for ordinary torts recognized under state law. In addition to concluding (at 606) that hedonic damages were not recoverable under North Carolina Law, the Livingston court (again at 606) provided the following discussion of hedonic dama ge t est imony obiter dicta.
Dr. Albrecht 's t est imony fails to pass muster under the Federa l Rules of E vidence. Rule 702 allows testimony by experts if the specialized knowledge claimed will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue. In a wrongful death action, recovery under a hedonic theory depends upon the extent of the diminishment of the survivors' pleasure of life...Dr. Albrecht's t estimony is devo id of any indicatio n of the extent to which the Livingstons' pleasure of life has deteriorated as a result of their son's death.
Furthermore also the plaintiffs expert bases his opinion on figures provided in the Violette and Chest nut st udy in arriving at his values of life and t he pleasur e of life. However, the study is better characterized as measuring the value of avoiding risk. As Dr. Havrilesky observed, the inducements necessary to persuade a person to perform a dangerous activity increase as the certainty of death increases until an infinite inducement is necessary for a person to engage in an activity involving certain death. As a result, the court finds that Dr. Albrecht 's o pinion neit her rests o n a reliable foundat ion no r do es it assis t t he co urt in determining a fact at issue.
In many respects, the Livingston court is anticipating the Daubert decision with its emphasis on meeting the requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. With its ruling, the court specifically rejected t he pla intiffs' co nte ntio n that "the value of life method olo gy is widely accepted as being applicable to wrongful death actions" and implicitly accepted the defense arg ument tha t "calculations on t he ple asure o f living are simply beyo nd t he sc ope of eco nomic science and are inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and 703" (recital at 606).
In other words, the court carefully defined "losses by survivors" as the standard that needed to be met and rejected claims based on "lost pleasures of life" of the decedent. we believe that Daubert is directed at situations where the scientific or technical basis for the expert test imony cannot be judicially noticed and a hearing must be held to determine its reliability...The trial court's initial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is based on an assertion or inference derived from scientific methodology...This includes an assessment of (a) whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and have been test ed; (b) whether the scientific theory has been subject ed to peer r eview and publication; (c) whether the scientific theory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and (d) whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the scientific community.
The Wilt decision then goes on to spell out precisely the "hedonic damage" methodology employed by Michael Brookshire; it points out that the studies used by Brookshire were not injury studies; it also points out that the underlying value of life studies were not presented into evidence and are not part of the record. The court wrote at 204:
...without a detailed explanation of the underlying studies' methodology, the expert testimony would not meet the reliability standard and the testimony should be excluded.
Even if we wer e to assume that Dr . Bro okshire's explanat ion of the the r eliability of the willingness-to-pay studies was sufficient, the question would then be whether the studies were sufficiently relevant to support his calculations on loss of the enjoyment of life.
Based on this, the court continued at 205:
Even if we were to assume that this methodology has some valid economic basis, we reject it from a legal standpoint because it has nothing to do with defining the particular value of the loss of the enjoyment of life in this case.
Moreover, the calculations are based on assumptions that appear t o contro vert logic and good sense. Anyone who is familiar with the wages o f coal miners, policemen, and firefighters would scoff at the assertion that these high risk jobs have any meaningful extra wage component for the risks undertaken by workers in those professions. ...Co nseq uent ly, the we conclud e that "the loss of enjoyment o f life re sult ing from a permanent injury is part of the general measure o f damages flowing from the permanent injury and is not subject to an economic calculation."
The case was remanded with the instructions that the plaintiffs could remit the hedonic damage award or seek a new trial on damages. In Laing (at 203 ), the app ellat e co urt not ed t hat the original t rial in t his case was he ld before Foster was decided and t hat the jury had be en instruct ed t hat damages wer e "wit hin their sole discretion." Further, the court separately considered the amount of damage awarded for loss of enjoyment of life and found the jury's decision reasonable and not unduly influenced by Smith's testimony. Consequently, at 204 the court determined:
Regard less o f whet her Dr. Smith's t est imony shou ld have bee n allowed, t here is ample evidence in the record to support the jury's award of $1,350,000 to Laing for loss of enjoyment of life and mental anguish. Laing suffered a severe traumat ic brain injury and was in a coma for over two months..more than seven years after his accident, requires assistance to perform basic tasks. He is unable to feed himself and cannot enjoy such activities as writing and cooking....Thus, even if it were in erro r to allow Dr. Smith's testimony on the issue of the money value of hedonic damages, we find that the record, independent of t his test imony, support s the jury's award for loss of enjoyment of life and mental anguish.
Similar to it s reaso ning in Foster, the Laing Court recognizes the conceptual basis of "hedonic damages," but does not see these damages as calculable by an economist. Wolfson, who is not listed as a NAFE member, but has participated in NAFE and AAEFE programs in the past.
In granting the motion, the court cited both (the pre-Daubert) Mercado, supra and FRE 702. The court gave its reasoning as follows (at *1):
Hedonic damages form a part of the award for general damages and it is the province of the jury to determine if plaintiff is entitled to recover general damages and, if so, in what amount...Dr. Wo lfson's rep ort is speculat ive in this regard and fails to pr ovide any scientific basis for its conclusion. T he average person is fully capable o f underst anding this issue without the aid of expert testimony...As such the testimony will be excluded. Daubert was not cited in the decision and no economist was named.
The court's answer to this two part question was given at 847: "...we hold that the value of life itself is compensable under our Act. Whether or no t expert t estimony is admitted fo r the purpose of proving this value is a matter best left to the rules of evidence of the applicable court."
Thus , bec ause the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony on t he enjo yment o f life was left to the trial co urt 's dis cre tio n, t he do or rema ined o pen fo r the po ssible admissibility of hedonic damage testimony in the New Mexico Courts, as was shown in the Sena case, which follows. At the trial, the jury awarded damages of $456,400, but no breakdown into damage categories was given in the recital. One o f the app eal points was the hedonic damage t estimony given by David Hamilton, who is not listed as a member of NAFE.
This case is t he only example that was found o f hedonics t estimony being allowed in the post Daubert era. In reaching a decision, the Sena court: (a) recognized that the loss of enjoyment of life is one of the elements o f nonpecuniary (general) damages (at 610 -611); and (b) extended the New Mexico Supreme Court's Romero ruling on reco very fo r the lost value of life from wrongful death to personal injury (at 610).
The court then concluded (at 611):
Consistent with the rule in Romero we think it is clear that New Mexico permits proof of nonpecuniary damages...Similarly, we conclude that where an expert witness has been pro perly qualified, it is not impro per for the trial court to permit an economist to testify regarding his or her opinion concerning the economic value of a plaintiff's lost of enjoyment of life (emphasis added).
In reaching its decision, the Sena court cited cases from several jurisdictions. Plaintiff seeks to present expert testimony on precise damage calculations for loss of enjoyment of life. The court finds that such damages are, by their very nature, not amenable to such analytic p recision. The co urt does not believe that such testimony would be helpful to the jury. The court believes that a jury is capable of determining these losses from its own experiences and knowledge, and t hrough testimony by Mr. Sullivan, and further concludes that the proffered testimony of Mr. Smith would improperly invade the provin ce o f the jur y. At 364, the court wrote: "We note first that, indisputably, hedonic damages are recoverable...Thus, the important issue-of-first-impression we face is strictly whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding damages."
The court acknowledges the ongoing controversy and debate over admissibility and then examines its own [Hawai'i] Rules 702 and 703 which consider the following factors of admis sibilit y (Montalvo at 365):
1) the evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 2) the evidence will a dd t o t he commo n und ers tanding of t he jury; 3) the underlying theory is generally accepted as valid; 4) the procedu res use d ar e ge ner ally ac cep ted as reliable if perfo rmed pr operly; 5) the procedure were applied and conducted properly in the present instance.
The court then provides a description of Rose's methodology before concluding (365-366):
Recent decisions, however , have sp ecifically reject ed exper t t est imony o n hedonic damages based upon willingness-to-pay studies...
The measur ement of the joy o f life is intangible.
A jury may draw upo n its o wn life experiences in attempting to put a monetary figure on the pleasure of living...Testimony of an economist would not aid the jury in making such measurements because an economist is no more expert at valuing the pleasure of life than the average juror. In Daubert, this court is instructed to be a gatekeeper and to make an initial determination whether proffered 'expert' testimony is helpful to the trier of fact, whether it is reliable, and whether it is valid. If not, it must be excluded. The majority of the court went on to offer some 'observations' of some of the 'many factors [which] will bear on the inquiry.'
The Court suggested: (1) has it been or can it be tested? (2) has it been subjected to peer review? (3 ) what is the po tential rate o f error? (4) how much accept ance do es it have wit hin t he r elevant scie ntific co mmunit y?
To these this court would add: (5) Are the underlying data untrustworthy for hearsay or ot her rea sons? (6 ) Do es t he under lying da ta exclu de o the r ca uses to a re aso nable confidence level? (7) What do the leading professional societies say about this specialty or this type of testimo ny? (8) Ho w much of t he t echnique is based o n the subject ive analysis or interpretation of the alleged "expert?" (9) The judge's experience and common sense.
The Hein court then utilizes these ten factors to conclude that the proffered testimony of Palfin is not admissible. In its evaluation, the court (at 232) contrasts hedonic damage calculations to traditional economic parameters as follows:
...predicted rat es of inflation, predicted salary escalations, average life expectancies, average wor klif expectanacies, average interest rates can all be looked at years do wn the line to determine whether we were correct in allowing expert estimates of economic loss. Such an evaluation after time has passed is a comforting response to the criticism that courts' decisions to accept or exclude novel scientific evidence may be "behind the curve," or may have a dampening effect on scient ific development . No such retro spect ive validation is possible in Dr. Palfin's theory of the valuation of hedonic damages. Speculative assumptions remain speculation (emphasis added).
In it s discussion, t he co urt also dra ws o n a pa per by Par ker Cashdo llar and Ma rsha Cop e Huie To answer Daubert's quest ion about the inherent rate of error in the metho dolog y, the proffered testimony appears to be more probably not true than true. The elimination of formal barriers to expert testimony has merely shifted to the trial judge the responsibility for keeping "junk science" out of the courtroom. it is a responsibility to be taken seriously. If the judge is not per suaded that a so-called expert has genuine knowledge that can be genuinely helpful to the jury, he should not let him testify.
Judge Shadur discusses FRE 403 (see this paper's footnote 2) and, having established a frame of reference, subjects Smith's hedonic damage methodology to its tests. He notes at 1059:
"No post-Daubert Sevent h Circ uit decision add resses t he ad missibilit y of exper t he donic damages t estimony. I n the past our Court of Appeals has sent mixed signals on t he subject generally and on Smith in particular [contrasting Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987) with Mercado, supra]....This opinion of co urse t akes t hose decisions thor oughly into account t o the extent that they are consist ent with Daubert."
Judge Shadur then itemizes what he regards "as five principle parts of Smith's calculations"-- (1) benchmarks, (2) adjustments, (3) pedigree, (4) empirical data, and (5) underlying assumptions--and looks at each in terms of their acco rdance with Daubert factors.
In considering "benchmarks,"Judge Shadur looks at the base value of life estimates from Brookshire/Smith. He finds that the main source relied upon is Miller's "Plausible Range" article, which he then subjects to a thorough analysis. He opines that Miller has engaged in inappropriate manipulation o f the studies to arr ive at the desired results, and does not find t his credible. At 1061 he wrote:
"Any objective reader can recognize the methodology as one that has made whatever adjustments were necessary to bring the raw data within a target range. Adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing with a predetermined result in mind cannot fairly be labeled science. To put it bluntly, Plausible Range strikes this Court as a prime candidate for an Oscar in the most-misleading-title category."
Judge S hadu r su gge sts tha t Smith's sele ction o f a $3 .5 millio n figure is done by a "simple eyeballing technique," about which he says at 1060-1061:
Eyeballing may have the advantage of ease, but it surely lacks scientific reliability in the sense of producing consistent results [citing Daubert]. Anyone can look at the same range and come up with a different figure. It also contributes to game playing. Note, for example, ho w quick "Dr . Ec ono mist" in the sample testimony (pr esumably Smith himself) is to exploit the method's malleability by suggesting that he could have picked a higher number (like $5 million) and that by opting for the lower figure he is somehow rendering a "conservative" opinion. Maybe so, but a conservative opinion in that sense does not equate to a scientific one. Someone who states on the basis of a dull pain in his right knee that he things it is going to rain less than .1 inch expresses a conservative, but surely an unscientific, opinion.
...In sum, neither the $3.5 nor the $2.5 million benchmark rests upon any scientific method or pro cedure , so tha t t est imony r egarding eit her one is inad missible under t he sc ientific knowledge prong of Rule 702.
Judge Shadur then turns to "adjustments," t he second of his five principle parts in Smith's methodology. He points out at 1061-1062:
By definition the willingness-to-pay model estimates the value of a statistical life--a nameless, faceless member of society...
Hedonic Damages purports to address that problem by adjusting the benchmark to account fo r ce rtain sp ecific char act eristics of t he pla intiff. ...That to o is misleading, and in combination with the relatively low probative value of the testimony also calls for its exclusion under Rule 403...
In su m, the low pr oba tive value of su ch t est imony ( ill-fitting dat a) is subs tantially out weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (a false appearance of tailoring t o the individual case).
With respect t o "pedigree," Judge Shadur lambasts Smith for claims in sample test imony in Smith's book (with Michael Brookshire) that the testimony stems from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776). Judge Shadur researches the Wealth of Nations and concludes at 1062-1063:
Unfortunately for Stan Smith, the surname Smith seems to be about the only thing they have in common.
Very little in the classic Wealth of Nations supports the Hedonic Damages method of valuing life, and much counsels against it...
Because the sa mple t est imony involving Adam S mith's classic w ork thus p rovides litt le support for Stan Smith's theory and much unfair prejudice when used to influence a law jury, it too is inadmissible under Rule 403.
Under "empirical data," Judge Shadur (discussion at 1063) finds the range in "value of life" models (bet ween $.5 and $9 million) t o be so wide that even if the studies were "science" the range precludes their being helpful under the standards of Rule 403.
Reviewing the "underlying assumptions" of the studies relied upon by Smith, Judge
Shadur (also at 1063) itemizes the following areas in which the willingness-to-pay module has been criticized for unrealistic assumptions: (1) that people have freedom of choice when confro nting risk, (2) that people perceive risk accurat ely, (3) t he nonmonetary factor s that drive many consumer purchases (e. g., advert ising); and (4) the political aspect s of government regulation (e.g. budgets, lobbyists). He offers the explanation (at 1064):
...willingness-to-pay methodology may be an appropriate guide for regulators but not for cour ts and juries tr aversing t he difficult terrain of valuing life. These t wo activities have very different foci: Regulators deal in averages, while courts deal with specific cases. Thus a st atistic al mean may have validity in the former c ont ext , while at the same time it simply creates the already-mentioned deceptive appearance of precision in the latter."
In su mmary, Judge S hadu r looks at ever y possible scientific implicatio n of t he "he donic Smith on hedonic damages, on grounds of scientific unreliability.
With respect to the first question, the Anderson cour t cited a prio r decision (Swiler v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 277 N.W. 2d 697 (1979) ) to affirm that loss of the enjo yment o f life can be recoverable in a personal injury claim, but expanded its explanation and wrote (at 739-
741):
However, we did not go so far in Swiler as to hold that hedonic damages were to be recognized as a separate and distinct category of damages....
We conclude...that loss of the enjoyment of life is not a separate category of damages but is an element or component of pain and suffering and of disability.
Translating human suffering into dollars and c ent s invo lves no mat hemat ical fo rmula ; it rests, as we have said, on a legal fiction. The figure that emerges is unavoidably distorted by the translation. Application of this murky process to the component parts of nonpecuniar y injurie s (ho weve r analytic ally dist inguis hable the y may be) cannot make it more accurat e. If anything, the distortion will be amplified by repetition.
The second appeal question addressed by the Anderson court is whether Stan V. Smith should have been permitted to testify as "an alleged expert on establishing a formula for calculating the value of lost enjoyment of life" (741).
The co urt cited many of the cases listed in t his paper and previous cases not permitt ing hedonic damage testimony and observed (at 741-742):
As a practical point, it is impossible to place a dollar figure on how each individual values his or her own life. Go vernment r egulators may at tempt to d o so for purposes of ad opt ing regulations, but any amount they arrive at is a fiction, designed to escape the obvious answer anyone would give when asked what one's own life was worth." ...under the Michigan jury instructions, enjoyment of life's pleasures is but one form of non-economic losses to be considered along with physical pain and suffering. It would be quite difficult for the jury to assess how much physical pain and suffering have already been taken into consideration in the statistical life value.
Summary
The impact of the Daubert decision is clear. In every case in which Daubert, the Federal Rules of Evidence or their stat e statut e derivat ives, or even Frye, have been mentio ned a s a ba sis for the admissibility of scientific evidence, "hedonic damage" testimony has been disallowed.
Furthermore, in every case in which the scientific accuracy of "hedonic damage" testimony was considered as a basis for the evidentiary decision, this testimony has failed the various tests of scientific accura cy po sed by the court s. T he rationale has been tha t t he t est imony is methodologically flawed, that it is not reliable, and therefore it is not admissible.
In finding against the admissibility of "hedonic damage" testimony, the courts have cited one or more of three basic reasons: first, that t he testimony is incorrectly focused, in death cases, on the deceased instead of the survivors; second, that the calculations are predicated on risk avoidance studies rat her than studies of pleasures lost; o r third, that the underlying studies involve gene ral d ata that is not sp ecific to the individual plaintiff and/ or specific cond itio ns that exist in the case at hand. The co urt s, fo r the most p art , do not see "hedonic damages" as objectively calculable. Thus, the determination of such damages should be left to the subjective province of the jury. As evidence of these points, the courts have noted that "hedonic" valuations lack general accept ance within the eco nomics community itself, a key criteria under bo th Daubert and its predecessor, the Frye Rule.
Indeed, as in Hein, Longman, Ayers and Anderson, there is some indication that judges are being angered by "hedonic damage" testimony, as if it represented a particularly egregious example of "junk science." In understanding this anger, it is important to understand that there may be a way in which judges are seeing the fundamental economics of "hedonic damages" more clearly than many for ensic economists. To a judge, a "wage-risk" st udy is a stu dy of the relationship between risk and wages. A judge can understand this connection, but what the judge cannot fathom is the connection between the risk in employment and purported measures of how much people enjoy their lives. And when they fail to see that relationship, the use of economics to draw this conclusion appears to them to be a manipulation aimed at creating pecuniary value for plaintiffs and an invasion of the jury's prerogatives.
Moreover, the red flag raised by the attempt to correlate wage-risk and consumer safety purchases with lost pleasure of life appears to create a judicial concern that results in a closer examination o f the "willingness-t o-pay" studies themselves, resulting in the conclusion that the studies are fat ally flawed. Judge Shadur's co mments in Ayers are a prime example. He dismisses the basic econo mic methodo logy of "hedo nic" valuation offered in the book by Bro okshire and Smith. He further concludes that Ted Miller's review of the "value of life" studies is very quest ionable scho larship, especially in light of the number of autho rs of "value of life" stud ies who have issued affidavits and other statements to the effect that their studies are being misused when "hedonic damage" testimony is presented. Economists are, to some extent, conditioned to accept the assertions of other economists that values can be placed on particular variables. Judges are not, and this allows them to proceed in their inquiries from a perspective of natural suspicion essential to t he "gate keeping" role espoused in Daubert. Limited, 1987, Vol. 4: 793-796. measures for either value based on the "willingness-to-pay" methodology; (b) whether, in death cases, any purpose of justice is served by awarding survivors compensation based on the losses of decedents; and (c) whether the measures used for such losses can be sufficiently disentangled from other aspects of both general and pecuniary losses.
The answer of the judges in the cases discussed in this paper to all of these questions is a resounding no. The co urts have also been concerned with the quest ion of whet her the persons purporting to report these calculations to juries actually have sufficient "expert" understanding of the underlying "willingness-to -pa y" st udies fro m which pro ffere d measur es are d raw n. I t is particularly significant to the courts that persons who have actually done these studies are not test ifying that their results measur e the value of either a decedent 's "whole life" or "the enjoyment of life." Indeed, the "value of life" literature pointedly abjures such interpretations. 8 Instead, "value of life" researchers issue affidavits indicating that their studies should not be used in this way because they were not intended for this purpose.
It has been said t hat economics is t he science o f common sense. When claims by economists do not meet the test of common sense, which the Hein judge added to the list of Daubert req uire ments, e conomics bec omes vulnerable to judicial challenge. Conversely, the re is another undertone in these cases that should be more reassuring to economists. Over and over, the judg es who a re r ejecting "hedonic damages" ar e do ing so in stated cont rast t o t heir accept ance of "lo st e arnings" and "lost hou seho ld services" method olo gies emplo yed by fo rensic eco nomists in death a nd injury litigat ion. Implicitly, the judg es are saying t hat the eco nomic methodologies used by economists for most ot her types of calculations do meet the Daubert standards.
The observat ion in Hein that Daubert's focus on testability is satisfied in earnings loss calculations becau se judges can see after the fact whether ot her types of economic pr ojections pro ved t o be accura te is ver y impor tant. This is sta ted to esta blish t he co ntr ast with "hed onic damage" testimony in which accuracy can never be tested, even after the fact. This affirmation of the scientific merit of conventional forensic economic methodology may be the single most important judicial observation in this set of cases. Economics as a whole has fared well after Daubert. It is "hedonic damage" alone that is not faring well under Daubert. It is "hedo nic damage" testimony alone that has fallen short of satisfying the Daubert criteria.
